


Whose Welfare Does AI Maximize?

Decision Perspectives in Economic Games:
Evidence from a Meta-Analysis and LLM Experiments

Qijun Zhu | Online Appendix

Figure B1. Individual comparisons: AI decisions

SBC | Dictator game: dictator | 84 comparisons from 14 studies | Rows 1-32




Squares and bars: individual comparisons and two-sided 95% confidence intervals.

Diamond: the pooled estimate for all comparisons in this game-role group.

Positive values: more SBC or stronger FE by AI. Axis limits are fixed within each game-role group.

Figure B1. Individual comparisons: AI decisions

SBC | Dictator game: dictator | 84 comparisons from 14 studies | Rows 33-64




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Figure B1. Individual comparisons: AI decisions

SBC | Dictator game: dictator | 84 comparisons from 14 studies | Rows 65-84




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
SBC | Ultimatum game: proposer | 43 comparisons from 8 studies | Rows 1-32



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
SBC | Ultimatum game: proposer | 43 comparisons from 8 studies | Rows 33-43



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Figure B1. Individual comparisons: AI decisions

SBC | Trust game: investor | 71 comparisons from 11 studies | Rows 1-32



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SBC | Trust game: investor | 71 comparisons from 11 studies | Rows 33-64





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
SBC | Trust game: investor | 71 comparisons from 11 studies | Rows 65-71



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Figure B1. Individual comparisons: AI decisions

SBC | Trust game: trustee | 47 comparisons from 8 studies | Rows 1-32




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Figure B1. Individual comparisons: AI decisions

SBC | Trust game: trustee | 47 comparisons from 8 studies | Rows 33-47




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Figure B1. Individual comparisons: AI decisions


SBC | Prisoner's dilemma: player | 215 comparisons from 22 studies | Rows 1-32



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
SBC | Prisoner's dilemma: player | 215 comparisons from 22 studies | Rows 33-64



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
SBC | Prisoner's dilemma: player | 215 comparisons from 22 studies | Rows 65-96



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Figure B1. Individual comparisons: AI decisions

SBC | Prisoner's dilemma: player | 215 comparisons from 22 studies | Rows 97-128




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
SBC | Prisoner's dilemma: player | 215 comparisons from 22 studies | Rows 129-160



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Figure B1. Individual comparisons: AI decisions

SBC | Prisoner's dilemma: player | 215 comparisons from 22 studies | Rows 161-192




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Figure B1. Individual comparisons: AI decisions

SBC | Prisoner's dilemma: player | 215 comparisons from 22 studies | Rows 193-215




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Figure B1. Individual comparisons: AI decisions

SBC | Public goods game: contributor | 66 comparisons from 11 studies | Rows 1-32




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
SBC | Public goods game: contributor | 66 comparisons from 11 studies | Rows 65-66



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
SBC | Stag hunt: player | 68 comparisons from 5 studies | Rows 1-32



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
SBC | Stag hunt: player | 68 comparisons from 5 studies | Rows 33-64



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
SBC | Stag hunt: player | 68 comparisons from 5 studies | Rows 65-68



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
FE | Ultimatum game: responder | 133 comparisons from 12 studies | Rows 1-32



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
FE | Ultimatum game: responder | 133 comparisons from 12 studies | Rows 33-64



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
FE | Ultimatum game: responder | 133 comparisons from 12 studies | Rows 65-96



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FE | Ultimatum game: responder | 133 comparisons from 12 studies | Rows 97-128



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
FE | Ultimatum game: responder | 133 comparisons from 12 studies | Rows 129-133



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Figure B1. Individual comparisons: AI decisions


FE | Third-party punishment: punisher | 18 comparisons from 3 studies | Rows 1-18



Squares and bars: individual comparisons and two-sided 95% confidence intervals.
Diamond: the pooled estimate for all comparisons in this game-role group.
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Figure B2. Individual comparisons: human behavior toward AI

People facing AI compared with people facing other humans | 12 comparisons from 5 studies



Squares and bars: individual comparisons and two-sided 95% confidence intervals.
Diamond: the pooled SBC estimate. FE contains one comparison and has no pooled diamond.
Positive values: more SBC or stronger FE toward AI than toward other humans.